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Special Law for Medical Specialists?
Bernard R. Koehne* and James G. Young**
S PECIALIZATION IS A FACT of life today that few will dispute.
In no field is this more evident than in medicine. Today it is
rare for an individual to visit a doctor for treatment of a case of
dandruff and find that the physician is also willing to look at an
ingrown toenail.1
We do not question the need for, or the benefits of special-
ization, but rather point to some of the confusion which results,
in legal cases involving the medical specialist. The apparent
contradiction that appears in proceedings involving specialists
is illustrated by two cases where the patient's heart stopped beat-
ing while on the operating table.
Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospita2 was an action against the
operating ophthalmologist on behalf of a six year old boy who
had undergone an operation to correct an inward deviation of
the eyes. During the administration of the anesthetic the pa-
tient's heart stopped. The anesthetist asked the ophthalmologist
to perform a thoracotomy,a necessary for internal heart massage.
The ophthalmologist stated that he was not able to perform a
thoracotomy and left the operating room to summon a capable
surgeon.
Approximately four minutes elapsed before a surgeon capa-
ble of performing the thoracotomy entered the operating room
and was able to start the heart. The child was revived, but sur-
vived a mute, spastic, blind quadriplegic from the lack of oxygen
and the resultant brain damage. At trial, defendant's motion for
dismissal, notwithstanding the verdict, was granted. On appeal,
judgment n.o.v. was reversed, and a new trial for defendant was
ordered.
* B.B.A., General Motors Institute; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
** B.S. in B.A., Ohio State Univ.; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Oleck, New Medicolegal Standards of Skill and Care, 11 Clev.-Mar. L.
Rev. 443 (1962). After a discussion of recent advances in medicine Dean
Oleck points to the need for attorneys to keep abreast of these advances
and their possible impact upon litigation.
2 41 Cal. Rptr. 577, 397 P. 2d 161 (1964).
3 A surgical incision in the wall of the chest.
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The comments of the court were interesting. Both the anes-
thesiologist and the ophthalmologist were highly qualified spe-
cialists. Cardiac arrest was shown to be a known risk when gen-
eral anesthesia is administered; by the same token, the generally
accepted procedure of handling this problem was open chest sur-
gery, if external massage was ineffective. Local medical associa-
tions had sponsored lectures, movies, etc., on the procedures, and
there were even plaques containing directions placed in the oper-
ating room. In addition, although the ophthalmologist had be-
come a specialist, he had received instruction in general surgery
in medical school. All of these factors could have provided bases
for an inference that, if the defendant ophthalmologist was not
capable of opening the chest (and it may well have been that he
should have been able to) a capable surgeon should have been in
the operating room. Even experts sympathetic to the defendant's
case were forced to admit that normal procedure was not fol-
lowed. Yet, in spite of these facts, the trial court was unable to
determine whether or not there was negligence, and found for
the defendant.
A different result was reached in Kolesar v. United States.4
Plaintiff was the wife of a member of the Armed Forces, thirty-
eight years old and a good surgical risk when admitted to a Navy
hospital for an exploratory laparotomy.5 During the operation
she suffered a cardiac arrest. The surgeon performing the opera-
tion tried to revive heart action by injecting ephedrine into the
heart, but this was not successful. Another surgeon was then
summoned and performed a thoracotomy and internal heart mas-
sage. The patient survived, but had suffered brain damage and
survived in a condition comparable to paraplegia. The judge
found that cardiac arrests and circulatory insufficiencies are gen-
erally known occurrences in connection with surgery, and that
a surgeon beginning a surgical procedure should have the ability
to perform a thoracotomy and manual heart massage. Judgment
was awarded to the plaintiff.
In both cases there was a failure to observe what has become
a standard procedure in cardiac arrest, that is, manual heart mas-
sage. The operation in the Kolesar6 case was performed in a
4 198 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Fla. 1961).
5 A surgical entering of the interior of the abdomen.
6 Kolesar v. U. S., supra n. 4.
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military hospital where clearly defined procedures and standards
were prescribed and, in this case, were not observed. On the
other hand, in Quintal,7 while there admittedly was a standard
procedure, the expert witnesses hedged enough to make it diffi-
cult for the judge to find negligence on the part of the defendant.
Standards of Care for Specialists
It is generally accepted that a doctor must exercise the skill
and care common to the medical profession in his community.
This standard, carried one step further as to the specialist, is
relatively the same; that is, the specialist should observe the de-
gree of skill and care ordinarily used by similar specialists in like
circumstances." Thus, while performing the duties in his particu-
lar field, the specialist must observe its standards no less, but
certainly no more.
Varying degrees of liability have been found by the courts.
An anesthesiologist applying a saddleblock anesthesia to a pa-
tient about to give birth was found to be liable even though it
was questionable that the plaintiff could show negligence in his
malpractice action. The court felt that there was an absolute lia-
bility on the part of the defendant as he is charged with the
knowledge of the nature and effect of such an anesthetic on the
body.9
The tragic case of Schwartz v. United States10 presents a
situation where the court felt that the patient was entitled to
reasonable medical care, and that the failure to check plaintiff's
medical record deprived him of that reasonable care. Plaintiff,
while in military service in 1944, was treated for sinusitis. As
part of the treatment, umbrathor" was injected into his sinus
7 Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital, supra n. 2.
8 Barnes v. Bovenmeyer, 255 Ia. 220, 122 N.W. 2d 312 (1963); Natanson v.
Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P. 2d 1093 (1960); Correia v. U. S., 339 F. 2d 596
(1st Cir. 1964); Delaney v. Rosenthall, 196 N.E. 2d 878 (Mass. 1964); Stone
v. Proctor, 259 N. C. 633, 131 S.E. 2d 297 (1963); but see Oberlin v. Fried-
man, 1 Ohio App. 2d 499, 205 N.E. 2d 663 (1965), where court felt qualifica-
tion was necessary in applying the standard.
9 Rothman v. Silber, 83 N. J. Super. 192, 199 A. 2d 86 (1964); also Mayor
v. Dowsett, 400 P. 2d 234 (Ore. 1965).
10 230 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964); see also Moon v. Mercy Hospital, 150
Colo. 430, 373 P. 2d 944 (1962), where plaintiff sought to have hospital found
liable for malpractice. The court ruled the doctor liable for activities rea-
sonably connected with the treatment or operation.
11 Trade-mark for a 25 per cent suspension of thorium oxide used as a
radiopaque medium.
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cavity for the purpose of taking x-rays. Plaintiff was discharged
from the service in 1945. Between 1946 and 1956, the plaintiff
visited Veterans Administration hospitals on a number of occa-
sions, and despite complaints and severe symptoms in later years,
the presence of the umbrathor was not discovered, although the
word umbrathor was prominently noted and underlined on his
medical record. After 1945 it became known generally that um-
brathor was dangerous in that it had carcinogenic properties.
A routine tooth extraction in 1956 finally disclosed plaintiff's
true condition. The umbrathor had in fact caused cancer, and
plaintiff underwent a severe operation requiring removal of a
substantial portion of the left side of his face, including bone
structure and his left eye. Judgment was awarded to the plain-
tiff on two grounds. The judge ruled that it was negligent to fail
to check the plaintiff's medical record and held that the work of
a government physician cannot be so compartmentalized that one
physician's knowledge of danger, based on the plaintiff's com-
plaints and symptoms, could be disregarded merely because he
had examined the patient for another purpose.
An Outmoded Rule
The so called locality rule has provided a route of escape for
the defendant in malpractice actions. I2 The often cited case of
Lockart v. Maclean1 3 provides an example of the rule in action.
After plaintiff's fractured leg had a pin inserted in it he devel-
oped an infection in the bone and consequently sued the physi-
cian for malpractice. The operation was performed and the suit
brought in Reno, Nevada. Plaintiff's expert witness was trained
in Colorado and Kansas and practiced in California, and because
of this the court felt that he was not qualified to give testimony
as to the standard of conduct for surgeons in Nevada.
The results of a thyroidectomy performed in Wilmington,
Delaware, included nerve damage.14 When plaintiff sought to
12 See: Note, Medical Specialties and the Locality Rule, 14 Stan. L. Rev.
884 (1962). In a short discussion the author points to evidence gathered
through a survey that indicates uniformity among the individual specialties
even though geographically distributed across the country.
13 77 Nev. 210, 361 P. 2d 670 (1961); see also, Fontenot v. Aetna Casualty
and Surety Co., 166 So. 2d 299 (La. 1964); Riggs v. Christie, 342 Mass 402,
173 N.E. 2d 610 (1961); Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. 370, 199 N.E. 2d 878
(1964).
14 DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A. 2d 333 (1961).
Sept., 1965
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss3/11
MEDICAL SPECIALISTS
introduce a New York surgeon as an expert witness, his testi-
mony was stricken from the record, as the court felt he was not
familiar with techniques that were employed by the physicians
of the Wilmington area. The defendant came prepared, utilizing
the testimony of surgeons from his own area. It did appear here
that an honest difference of opinion in surgical techniques arose;
however, the court felt impelled to follow the opinion of the local
physician and not even consider that of plaintiff's expert.
On the other hand, a defendant's attempt to show that stand-
ards in Portland, Oregon, were different from those in Longview,
Washington-50 miles away-was not successful.15 The proxim-
ity of the two cities; the experience of plaintiff's witness in the
general area for several years; and the fact that defendant had
been educated and had practiced in both cities led the court to
refuse to bar the testimony of the plaintiff's expert.
Also of interest is a recent Utah case.1 6 Here, over objections
of defendant, plaintiff was allowed to introduce an expert from
the San Francisco area. This surgeon, besides having practiced
in California for almost seven years, had spent part of World
War II in the service, where he had performed 130 to 150 opera-
tions such as the one in dispute. Furthermore he had done some
writing, traveling and lecturing on the subject, and was familiar
with the general practice in small towns across the country as to
proper treatment of the fracture plaintiff had received. Helpful
to plaintiff's case also was an admission by the defendant that
the procedure for setting this fracture was fairly uniform.
The problem of just what the community or locality actually
consists of today becomes an even greater task. Population cen-
ters expand constantly, so that in the not-too-distant future on
the East Coast of the United States, say, you may travel several
hundred miles through five or six states and not leave an urban
or suburban area. Secondly, the communications systems have
increased so that it becomes possible for a medical student in
California to watch an operation performed at a New York hos-
pital over closed-circuit television. By the same token, that stu-
dent may finish school in California, take his internship and resi-
15 Teig v. St. John's Hospital, 63 Wash. 2d 369, 387 P. 2d 527 (1964); see
also, Cook v. Lichtblau, 144 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1962) where the court felt that
Miami and West Palm Beach were certainly in the same urban complex;
and see, Sinz v. Owens, 205 P. 2d 3 (Cal. 1949); Kolesar v. U. S. supra n. 4.
16 Riley v. Layton, 329 F. 2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964).
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dence in the East, and return to California to practice. The rea-
sons for considering the "locality rule" have thus become less
compelling.
Making the Defendant the Plaintiff's Witness
Plaintiffs in malpractice actions may be getting a chance to
twist the tiger's tail, if a recent New York decision 17 has wide-
spread effect. As the specialist works in his own little niche, it
becomes a difficult task to obtain the proper expert witnesses to
support the plaintiff's case and attack the defendant's position.
The answer to this problem may be in using the defendant as
the plaintiff's expert. The McDermott case involved a corneal
transplant that proved to be unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff sub-
sequently lost the sight of her left eye. The malpractice suit was
brought under two theories: One, that the doctors who advised
the operation made misrepresentations as to the outcome; the
other, that the operation itself should not have been performed,
and the fact that it was contrary to accepted medical practice.
Miss McDermott's case depended on her ability to introduce
expert testimony which would support her allegations. At trial,
besides her own testimony, she called on two of the defendant
doctors. She did not introduce expert testimony of her own, but
sought to show malpractice by questioning the defendants as to
their knowledge of the particular operation and the accepted
medical standard for it. The trial court upheld defendant's ob-
jection to testifying and was forced to dismiss the case due to
lack of expert testimony. The Appellate Division upheld the de-
cision, but modified to allow plaintiff to introduce expert testi-
mony in a new action.
The Court of Appeals further modified this decision to allow
a new trial, and in so doing discussed the difficulty in obtaining
expert testimony:
The importance of enabling the plaintiff to take the testi-
mony of the defendant doctor as to both "fact" and "opinion"
is accentuated by recognition of the difficulty inherent in
securing "independent" expert witnesses. It is not always
a simple matter to have one expert, a doctor in this case,
condemn in open court the practice of another, particularly
if the latter is a leader in his field. In consequence, the
17 McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital, 15 N. Y. 2d 20, 203
N.E. 2d 469 (1964).
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plaintiff's only recourse in many cases may be to question
the defendant doctor as an expert in the hope that he will
thereby be able to establish his malpractice claim.'
The court could see nothing wrong in permitting plaintiff to
call the defendant, discarding the claim that it was, at least, un-
fair to do so. In summing up, they went on to say:
In short, then, a plaintiff in a malpractice action is entitled
to call the defendant doctor to the stand and question him
both as to his factual knowledge of this case (that is, as to
his examination, treatment and the like) and, if he be so
qualified, as an expert for the purpose of establishing the
generally accepted medical practice in the community. While
it may be the height of optimism to expect that such a plain-
tiff will gain anything by being able to call and question (as
an expert) the very doctor he is suing, the decision whether
or not to do so is one which rests with the plaintiff alone.19
Prior to the McDermott case Ohio followed the rule laid
down in Forthofer v. Arnold20 that, if the defendant objected,
plaintiff could not use the defendant as his expert via the route
of cross-examination; however, a recent Ohio decision2 1 seems
to agree with the New York view. Citing McDermott,22 the Ohio
Supreme Court now says that it is possible to use the defendant
as an expert and to require him to testify to things other than
the specific facts of the case.
A few other states23 also had previously followed this line of
thinking. Obviously the problem of eliciting expert testimony
has not suddenly been solved. As Judge Fuld remarked,24 the
plaintiff must be highly optimistic when putting the defendant
on the stand as his own witness, but lacking all other expert tes-
timony, skilled counsel will at least have a chance to establish
the critical standard of the case, and at the same time (hope-
fully) elicit other information which will be helpful to the plain-
Is Id. at 474.
19 Id. at 475.
20 60 Ohio App. 436 (1938).
21 Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147 (1965).
22 McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital, supra n. 17.
23 Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 8, 147 P. 2d 604 (1944); State for use of
Miles v. Brainin, 224 Md. 156, 167 A. 2d 117 (1961); Snyder v. Pantaleo, 143
Conn. 290, 122 A. 2d 21 (1956).
24 McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital, supra n. 17.
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tiff's case. It has been the practice in some states to allow the
defendant doctor to take the stand, but not to allow questions
that go beyond facts within the individual's particular knowl-
edge. 25 Hopefully, the courts will allow, in the future, the scope
of testimony to be widened to include any questions the plaintiff
may wish to ask relating to the defendant's particular specialty.
Other Facets of Testimony
Ordinarily, expert testimony must be used to establish negli-
gence. This is an understandable requirement in view of the
technical matters beyond the comprehension of a layman that
medicine so often involves, but this is not true in all cases. The
requirement of an expert witness has been relaxed where the
physical facts would allow a jury to infer negligence, 26 or the in-
competency is so obvious as to allow a layman to decide the
question.27
Courts will also restrict the scope of testimony of a physician
who is not a specialist in an action involving malpractice of a
specialist. In Rash v. City and County of San Francisco 28 a gen-
eral practitioner who had not been trained in the particular spe-
cialty was found to lack the qualifications to give expert testi-
mony on techniques to be followed by the specialist, but could
testify as to matters within the knowledge and observation of
every physician.
A physician who had been in general practice for eleven
years in Chicago and had not operated for several years, lacked
the necessary qualifications as an expert to testify as to thyroid
surgery in Wisconsin.29 Here there was seemingly an attack both
25 Hull v. Plume, 131 N. J. 511, 37 A. 2d 53 (1944); Ericksen v. Wilson, 266
Minn. 401, 123 N.W. 2d 687 (1963); Osborn v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 P. 967
(1913); Hundler v. Rindlaub, 61 N. D. 389, 237 N.W. 915 (1931).
26 Moehlenbrock v. Parke Davis & Co., 145 Minn. 100, 176 N.W. 169 (1920);
and see, Manzoni v. Hamlin, 202 N.E. 2d 264 (Mass. 1964) even though med-
ical evidence was lacking defendant's statement was sufficient; and, Roberts
v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W. 2d 627 (1963).
27 Sawyer v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, 234 N. Y. S. 2d 372 (1962).
28 19 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1962); see also, Caton v. Richardson, 287 S.W. 2d 683
(Tex. 1965).
29 Peterson v. Carter, 182 F. Supp. 393 (W.D. Wis. 1960); see also, Hanberry
v. Fitzgerald, 72 N. M. 383, 384 P. 2d 256 (1963) where a general practitioner
was conceded to be a qualified witness, but since not an expert in vascular
diseases his testimony was not allowed; and Korljan v. Johnson, 96 Ariz. 25,
391 P. 2d 584 (1964).
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on his qualifications as to his expertise and an alleged difference
that might exist in technique between Chicago and Southern
Wisconsin.
Conclusion
Undoubtedly a state of flux and uncertainty exists in the law
at this time as to the treatment of medical specialists, and this
condition will probably continue for some time.
The plaintive remark of an Indiana court epitomizes the
vaguely hopeful (but quite unspecific) view of modern courts
as to what to do about medical specialization:
In this age of specialization in the practice of medicine it is
the duty and function of the courts of law to apply rules of
law with an intelligent understanding in the field of medi-
cine and surgery.30
30 Huber v. Protestant Deaconess Hospital, 127 Ind. App. 565, 133 N.E. 2d
864, at 869 (1957).
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